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GENERAL JURISDICTION 2.0: THE UPDATING AND
UPROOTING OF THE CORPORATE PRESENCE
DOCTRINE
Edward D. Cavanagh
I. INTRODUCTION
For well over a century, state courts have exercised personal jurisdiction over
foreign corporations if they engage in commerce within the state “not occasionally
or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.”1 This assertion
of judicial power, referred to as general jurisdiction2 and also as the corporate
presence doctrine,3 permitted courts to entertain claims that had no nexus with the
forum state4 against foreign companies “doing business” within that state.5 The
United States Supreme Court, however, sent this line of cases “careening into the
abyss”6 in Daimler AG v. Bauman,7 wherein the Court held that “the exercise of
general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial,
continuous, and systematic course of business’ . . . is unacceptably grasping.”8
Redefining general jurisdiction, the Court ruled that a foreign corporation may be
sued on a claim arising outside the forum state only where the foreign corporation
can be said to be “at home” in the forum state.9 Absent exceptional circumstances,
“at home” means the state of incorporation or the state of defendant’s principal
place of business.10
Not since the wholesale dismantling of quasi in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer v.
Heitner11 has the Supreme Court acted so dramatically and decisively to curtail the

 Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. A.B., University of Notre Dame; J.D.
Cornell Law School; LL.M. and J.S.D. Columbia Law School.
1. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267 (1917).
2. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-44 (1966).
3. In EED Holdings v. Palmer Johnson Acquisition Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271-72 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), the court described the corporate presence doctrine as follows:
Pursuant to case law codified by section 301 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules
(“CPLR”), an unlicensed foreign corporation is subject to the general personal
jurisdiction of the courts of New York if such corporation is “doing business” in the state.
A defendant corporation is deemed to be “doing business” in New York if it has engaged
in “such a continuous and systematic course of [business] here that a finding of its
‘presence’ in this jurisdiction is warranted[.]”
(citations omitted).
4. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011); see
generally DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 82 (5th ed. 2011).
5. EED Holdings, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 271-72.
6. David D. Siegel, U.S. Supreme Court Severely Circumscribes “Presence” as Basis for Personal
Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporation, SIEGEL’S PRAC. REV. Jan. 2014, at 1.
7. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
8. Id. at 761 (citation omitted).
9. Id. at 769 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 760.
11. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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exercise of jurisdiction under a long-recognized legal doctrine. In the ongoing
battle between plaintiffs for access to the courts and defendants for fairness,
Daimler has given the defendants a leg up.
In the wake of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,12 the principal focus of
jurisdictional analysis has been specific jurisdiction; that is, jurisdiction based on
claims arising out of defendant’s activities within the forum state. As a result,
“general jurisdiction has come to occupy a less dominant place in the contemporary
scheme.”13 Still, the Court in Daimler, focusing on the international aspects of the
case, saw the need to rein in the exercise of general jurisdiction; otherwise, a
foreign corporation could be sued everywhere that it had substantial business
interests.14 Daimler will severely curb, if not eliminate from the American courts,
suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants arising outside of the United
States. Where there is a United States nexus—an American defendant or a claim
arising here—the Daimler decision will likely be of less import, especially since
Daimler makes clear that an American defendant can always be sued where the
claim arises as well as in its state of incorporation or principal place of business.15
Nevertheless, the decision is bound to invite future litigation. The Daimler
Court avoided the question of whether the acts of a subsidiary in the forum state
should be imputed to the parent for jurisdictional purposes.16 The Court was
unclear on the facts needed to establish exceptional circumstances that would
permit the exercise of general jurisdiction in a forum other than defendant’s state of
incorporation or principal place of business. The Court was also unclear on the
extent to which fairness considerations are relevant in deciding whether general
jurisdiction is proper. In short, Daimler is most likely not the last word on general
jurisdiction from the Supreme Court.
This article will (1) trace the evolution of general jurisdiction; (2) analyze the
Daimler holding; (3) examine the impact of Daimler; and (4) discuss issues
regarding general jurisdiction that courts must resolve going forward.
II. EVOLUTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Common Law
The common law recognized only two bases for the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction: presence and consent.17 Jurisdiction based on presence turned on
whether the defendant had been served with process while physically present
within the bounds of the bailiwick. Pennoyer v. Neff18 is the seminal case on
personal jurisdiction in the United States. There, the Supreme Court embraced the
common law’s theory of territoriality governing the exercise of personal
12. 526 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758.
14. Id. at 760-61.
15. Id. at 761.
16. Id. at 759-60.
17. For in personam jurisdiction to attach, a defendant “must be brought within [the court’s]
jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance.” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
18. Id.
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jurisdiction.19 In holding that Oregon courts lacked jurisdiction over a California
resident who had been served with process via publication in a local Oregon
newspaper, the Court stated “that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.”20 Conversely, “no
tribunal established by [the State] can extend its process beyond [its] territory so as
to subject either persons or property to its decisions.”21 Any attempt to do so “is a
mere nullity, and incapable of binding” persons or property outside of the State.22
Thus, at common law, physical power over the defendant provided the basis
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. A state was all-powerful with respect to
defendants served with process within the physical bounds of its territory. On the
other hand, a state had no power with respect to a defendant located outside of its
bounds. Under the common law approach, any attempt to exercise jurisdiction over
a defendant located outside the physical boundaries of the forum was viewed as an
affront to the sovereignty of a sister state.23
Consent, on the other hand, was a more flexible concept. Consent could be
express or implied and could be manifested in several ways.24 Express consent
may be created by the execution of a forum selection clause in a contract.25
Implied consent exists where a defendant files a notice of appearance or simply
participates in the proceedings, without challenging personal jurisdiction, in which
case any objection to personal jurisdiction is deemed waived.26 Consent need not
be voluntary and may be exacted by the state.27 For instance, states typically
require foreign corporations to appoint a state officer as an agent for service of
process and thus to submit to personal jurisdiction as a condition of being granted
license to do business in a given state.28
B. Erosion of Limiting Common Law Principles and Expansion of Personal
Jurisdiction
As the twentieth century dawned, it became increasingly apparent that the
restrictive common law rules governing personal jurisdiction no longer meshed
with the needs of a changing society. In the early 1900s, America was in the state
of transition. The automobile made it easy for people to move from place to place;
no longer were people anchored for life to their birth places. The pace of
urbanization of America, which had begun in the nineteenth century, accelerated as
19. Id. at 722.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 722-23.
23. Id. at 723-24.
24. See R.R. Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 65, 81 (1870).
25. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964).
26. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp. Inc. v. Comm. of Receivers for A.W. Galadari, 810 F. Supp.
1375, 1389 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F. 2d 1067, 1070 (2d Cir. 1972)).
27. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (“The state may, therefore, impose as a condition
upon which a foreign corporation shall be permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall
stipulate that in any litigation arising out of its transactions in the state, it will accept as sufficient the
service of process on its agents or persons specially designated, and the condition would be eminently fit
and just.”).
28. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1314 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2016, chapter 1).
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immigrants flocked to the United States and soldiers returned from fighting the
First World War29 in Europe.
The introduction of the automobile in the twentieth century underscored the
inadequacies of the common law’s restrictive approach to personal jurisdiction.
For example, a New Jersey resident could drive an automobile into New York,
negligently cause a collision on New York roads that gave rise to both personal
injuries and property damage to New York citizens, but under Pennoyer, still not be
answerable in the New York courts by simply driving back to New Jersey and not
returning to New York. Beginning in 1923, state legislatures then undertook to
protect their citizens by enacting non-resident motor vehicle statutes.30 For
example, New York’s Vehicle and Traffic law, enacted in 1929, would make a New
Jersey driver answerable in a New York court for harm caused to New York
residents by its negligent acts in New York.31 Today, non-resident motor vehicle
statutes are universal.32
These statutes, which sustained the exercise of personal jurisdiction beyond the
bounds set by Pennoyer, were tested in the courts. The United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of non-resident motor vehicle statutes in Hess v.
Pawloski.33 Hess involved an action in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts plaintiff
who had been injured when hit by a car driven in Massachusetts by the defendant, a
Pennsylvania domiciliary.34 Jurisdiction was based on a Massachusetts statute
which provided that the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles is deemed as a
matter of law to be the agent for service of process for any out-of-state driver sued
in Massachusetts courts for negligent operation of a motor vehicle on the
Massachusetts roads and that an action against any out-of-state driver so accused
may be commenced by service of process on the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.35
The Massachusetts statute further required the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to
forward a copy of the summons and complaint via registered mail to the defendant,
and the Commissioner in Hess did so.36
Plaintiff thus complied with the statute and although the defendant had notice
of the lawsuit, he nevertheless challenged the jurisdiction as void under Pennoyer
because Massachusetts process was served outside of Massachusetts boundaries.37
The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that jurisdiction was proper, even under
Pennoyer, because defendant had impliedly consented to Massachusetts
jurisdiction by using Massachusetts roads,38 was properly served through a
statutory agent, and had actual notice of the lawsuit.39 In so ruling, the Court noted
29. Indeed, a popular post-World War I song was entitled “How Ya Gonna Keep ‘em Down on the
Farm (After They’ve Seen Paree).”
30. See Marshall J. Jox, Non-Resident Motorists Service of Process Act, 33 F.R.D. 151, 153 (19631964).
31. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 253-54 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2016, chapter 1).
32. Jox, supra note 30, at 153.
33. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
34. Id. at 353.
35. Id. at 353-54.
36. Id. at 354.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 356.
39. Id.
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that automobiles are “dangerous machines” that pose “serious dangers to persons
and property,” and that a state may make and enforce reasonable regulations to
promote due cause on the part of residents and non-residents alike in driving on
state highways.40
Arguably, the implied consent theory stressed in the Hess opinion was merely
an incremental expansion of existing personal jurisdiction standards set forth in
Pennoyer.
After all, Pennoyer recognized the validity of consent-based
jurisdiction. Clearly, however, Hess involved much more than consent. Implied
consent was a mere legal fiction. If Hess truly turned on implied consent, then outof-state motorists who expressly stated (in writing or otherwise) that they were not
consenting to personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts by using the roads there could
not, and would not, be deemed to have impliedly consented to Massachusetts
jurisdiction. Express statements supersede implied statements. In Hess, however,
no amount of actual protest of Massachusetts jurisdiction by the defendant would
have changed the result. The real basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in Hess was
not consent, but rather the defendant’s commission of a tortious act in
Massachusetts.41 The Hess ruling thus foreshadowed the major changes in
jurisdictional rules that were down the road.
In addition to enacting non-resident motor vehicle statutes, legislators also
sought to expand on common law principles by passing laws that would make
domiciliaries of a state subject to jurisdiction in that state, even if personally served
elsewhere.42 Although domicile is only a stone’s throw from presence and hence
only a modest extension of a forum’s jurisdictional reach, the issue was litigated up
to the Supreme Court, in Milliken v. Meyer.43 There, the Supreme Court held that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on the defendant’s domicile did not
offend due process.44 The case involved a commercial dispute between the
parties.45 Milliken commenced an action in Wyoming state court seeking
cancellation of alleged contracts with Meyer and for an accounting.46 Jurisdiction
over Meyer was premised on a Wyoming statute authorizing the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Wyoming domiciliaries.47 Meyer was personally served
with Wyoming process in Colorado.48 Meyer did not appear in the Wyoming
40. Id.
41. In Oberding v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953), Justice Frankfurter underscored
the fact that the consent theory in Hess was legal fiction, stating:
It is true that in order to ease the process by which new decisions are fitted into preexisting modes of analysis there has been some fictive talk to the effect that the reason
why a non-resident can be subjected to a state’s jurisdiction is that the non-resident has
“impliedly” consented to be sued there. In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in these
cases does not rest on consent at all. The defendant may protest to high heaven his
unwillingness to be sued and it avails him not.
(citation omitted).
42. See generally Conflict of Laws: Jurisdiction to Render Personal Judgment Against Absent
Domiciliary. Personal Service Outside the State, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 724 (1941).
43. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
44. Id. at 463-64.
45. Id. at 459-60.
46. Id. at 459.
47. Id. at 461.
48. Id. at 459.
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action, and the court entered a default judgment.49 Thereafter, Meyer brought an
action in Colorado seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Wyoming judgment for
lack of in personam jurisdiction, claiming that service of Wyoming process on him
in Colorado did not confer jurisdiction and that any judgment rendered thereon
violated due process.50
The Colorado trial court agreed with Milliken and dismissed Meyer’s attempt
to collaterally attack the Wyoming judgment.51 The Colorado Supreme Court,
without passing on the jurisdictional issue, reversed “because of an irreconcilable
contradiction between the findings and the decree.”52 The United States Supreme
Court reversed and upheld the Wyoming judgment.53
First, the Court held that “[d]omicile in the state alone is sufficient to bring an
absent defendant within the reach of the state’s jurisdiction for purposes of a
personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service.”54 In so holding,
the Court found that “the authority of a state over one of its citizens is not
terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state.”55 The Court explained
that a domiciliary, though absent from a state, still enjoys the benefits of
citizenship.56 Enjoyment of the privileges of domicile creates reciprocal duties on
the domiciliary’s part, including the duty to answer any claim lodged against it in
the courts of its domicile.57
Second, the Supreme Court rejected Meyer’s argument that extraterritorial
service of Wyoming process violated the due process clause.58 The Court held that
Meyer, having been personally served with process in Colorado, had actual notice
of the lawsuit and that such service had met the due process standard of “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”59
C. The Revolution: International Shoe
The Supreme Court ushered in the modern era of jurisdictional analysis with
its landmark decision in International Shoe.60 In that case, the State of Washington
sued International Shoe, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in Missouri, for unpaid contributions to the state’s unemployment compensation
fund.61 International Shoe denied any liability for employment taxes, claiming that
it was not doing business in Washington and had no employees there.62 The record
revealed International Shoe’s carefully constructed business model for conducting
its Washington activities, specifically designed to avoid any claims for payment
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id. at 463.
Id.
Id. at 463-64.
Id. at 462-63.
Id. at 463.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 311-12.
Id. at 312.
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under Washington’s unemployment tax and to provide a factual basis supporting its
claims that it was not doing business in Washington.63
Thus, International Shoe:









Had no employees in Washington but sold its goods through a network
of independent agents;
paid no wages to these agents, but rather paid them commissions based
on orders obtained;
had no offices in Washington, but did rent hotel rooms and other space
where its agents could display International Shoe wares;
made no sales within the state of Washington but instead took orders for
shoes from customers; those orders were processed and approved at the
home office in Missouri;
maintained no inventory within the state but periodically displayed its
line of shoes for prospective customers in local hotel rooms;
made no deliveries in intrastate commerce; all goods were shipped into
Washington via common carrier from Missouri;
maintained no bank accounts in Washington; and
salesmen had no power over the price of goods offered by International
Shoe.64

On the other hand, additional facts suggested a significant presence within the
state:





International Shoe maintained a sales force of eleven to thirteen
individuals to display shoes in Washington and to receive orders;
the sales force was paid on the basis of commissions earned on sales
made within Washington;
all sales personnel lived in Washington; and
their sales territories were confined to Washington.65

In short, International Shoe argued that it was not doing business in
Washington and that, at most, it was merely soliciting business, which would not
have been enough to subject the company to the jurisdiction of the State of
Washington under Pennoyer and its progeny.66 The Supreme Court rejected that
reasoning, focused on the substance rather than on the form of International Shoe’s
business model, and reformulated the constitutional standards governing a state’s
assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign business entity, stating:
Now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”67

In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the formalistic standards enunciated in
Pennoyer, which focused on territoriality and physical power over the defendant, in
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 313-14.
Id.
Id. at 313-15.
Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 316.
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favor of a more flexible standard based on the defendant’s “minimum contacts”
with the state and fairness.68 The test “cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative;”69 rather, the question of “[w]hether due process is satisfied must
depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws of which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure.”70 Whether or not there are minimum contacts with the forum
state thus turns on two factors: (1) the systematic and continuous nature of the
activity in the forum state; and (2) the relationship between that activity and the
claim for relief asserted by the plaintiff.71 This, in turn, creates a matrix consisting
of four areas of analysis:
Area 1 - no systematic and continuous activities and the cause of action is
unrelated to defendant’s forum activities.72 Here exercise of personal jurisdiction
would offend due process.73 The Court ruled that “the casual presence of the
corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a
state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of
action unconnected with the activities there.”74 The Court further observed that due
process “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in
personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations.”75
Area 2 - systematic and continuous activities in the forum state and the claim
for relief arises out of those activities.76 The Court found that the propriety of
exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign entity under these circumstances
“has never been doubted.”77
Area 3 - no systematic and continuous activities in the forum state but the
claim for relief arises out of defendant’s contacts with the forum.78 In dicta, the
Court noted that prior decisions had gone both ways on the question of whether
committing a single act within a state giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim is
constitutionally sufficient to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
foreign entity.79 The test for the exercise of jurisdiction “cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative,” but “must depend rather upon the quality and nature of
the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.”80
Area 4 - systematic and continuous activities within the state but the claim is
unrelated to defendant’s forum activities.81 Again in dicta, the Court recognized
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 319.
Id.
See id. at 317.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 319.
See id. at 317.
See id.
Id. at 318-19.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 318.
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that there are cases where a foreign corporation’s local activity is “so substantial
and of such nature to justify suit against it on causes of actions arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”82 By contrast, the Court also
recognized that prior cases had held that “continuous activity of some sort[] within
a state” was not enough to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction on a claim
unrelated to forum activities.83 As was the case with Area 3, the Court left
determination of Area 4 issues for another day.
D. The Cases Post-International Shoe
Not surprisingly, the cases decided after International Shoe have arisen in Area
3 and Area 4, which the Court had acknowledged were unsettled territories.
1.

Area 3 - Specific Jurisdiction

Area 3, often referred to as specific jurisdiction, has garnered most of the
attention from the courts. This is not surprising, given the globalization of
commerce and the explosion of products liability litigation dating back to the midtwentieth century. As legislatures enacted long-arm statutes to take advantage of
the broader jurisdictional bases permitted by International Shoe,84 the courts sought
to flesh out the meaning of, and the constitutional limitations imposed by, the
minimum contacts test. In Hanson v. Denckla,85 decided thirteen years after
International Shoe, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the constitutional
standards governing the exercise of jurisdiction had evolved since the days of
Pennoyer but then stated that “it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the
eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.”86
The Court further stated that “[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
[minimum] contact with the forum State.”87 Rather, “it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.”88
Over a decade later, in World-Wide Volkswagen,89 (“WWV”) the Court
recapitulated virtually verbatim its holding in Hanson. In WWV, the Court held
that the state of Oklahoma lacked personal jurisdiction over a New York wholesaler
who distributed cars in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut and a New York
auto dealer who had sold plaintiffs an allegedly defective car in a products liability
action arising from an accident occurring in Oklahoma.90 In its decision, the Court
stressed the absence of any meaningful affiliating circumstances between the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (MCKINNEY, Westlaw through L.2016, chapter 1).
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 253.
Id.
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id. at 288-91.
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defendants and the forum state.91 The Court rejected the argument that because the
automobile could be driven almost anyplace, it was foreseeable that the car would
wind up in Oklahoma and that such foreseeability was sufficient for Oklahoma to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the New York wholesaler and retailer.92 In so
ruling, the Court did not hold that foreseeability was irrelevant to the jurisdictional
analysis. Rather, it held that the foreseeability that is relevant to the exercise of
long-arm jurisdiction in the due process context is not the likelihood that the car in
question could find its way to Oklahoma, but whether “the defendant’s conduct and
connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.”93 The Court emphasized that the burden on the defendant is
a primary concern in measuring reasonableness but also set forth a list of factors
that must be considered in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, including: “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief[;] . . . the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies.”94
Still, the WWV Court sent a mixed message. On the one hand, the Court made
clear that International Shoe had not rendered state boundaries irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes and that, quoting language from Hanson reminiscent of
Pennoyer, restrictions on a state’s power to exercise jurisdiction “are a consequence
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.”95 On the other
hand, the Court suggested that the Constitution still allows the states broad powers
in adjudicating actions arising from conduct occurring outside their borders, stating
that “[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if
it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers
in the forum State.”96 The “stream of commerce” reference suggests that,
91. Id. at 289. The Court found that the wholesaler distributed autos, parts and accessories to
retailers located in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. Id. The retailer was a New York
corporation that sold cars to customers locally in Massena, New York. Id. at 288, 298. The Court
concluded:
Insofar as the record reveals, Seaway and World-Wide are fully independent corporations whose
relations with each other and with Volkswagen and Audi are contractual only. Respondents
adduced no evidence that either World-Wide or Seaway does any business in Oklahoma, ships or
sells any products to or in that State, has an agent to receive process there, or purchases
advertisements in any media calculated to reach Oklahoma. In fact, as respondents’ counsel
conceded at oral argument, there was no showing that any automobile sold by World-Wide or
Seaway has ever entered Oklahoma with the single exception of the vehicle involved in the
present case.
Id. at 289.
92. Id. at 295-96.
93. Id. at 297. The Court further noted that this approach “gives a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will or will not render them liable to suit.” Id.
94. Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 294 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
96. Id. at 297-98.
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notwithstanding the limiting language elsewhere in the opinion, long-arm statutes
still have a very broad reach.
Yet, perhaps because the Court concluded that jurisdiction was lacking, the
extent of that reach was not explored in WWV. For over three decades, the socalled stream of commerce theory has been the focus of the debate on the limits of
the exercise of specific jurisdiction. How do courts square the notion that state
boundaries place inherent limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction with the view
that a defendant who places its goods in the stream of commerce should be
answerable to lawsuits brought in states where a product is purchased by
consumers?
That question has divided the Supreme Court. In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court,97 a plurality of four urged that due process requires more than that
a defendant simply deliver its products into the stream of commerce with the
understanding that they will be used there; it must “purposefully direct” its
activities at the forum state.98 Under this view, a seller who engaged in interstate
commerce but consciously chose not to market its products in a given state would
not be amenable to suit there, even if its products wound up in the forum state and
caused injury to the plaintiff in the forum.99 The other five members of the Court
in Asahi, in two separate opinions, seemed to be of the view that WWV’s stream of
commerce theory did not limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction to those cases in
which defendant’s conduct is purposefully directed at the forum state.100
All of the Justices agreed, however, that it would offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice for California to exercise in personam jurisdiction
over Asahi on the record before it.101 Accordingly, the discussion concerning the
continuing viability of the WWV’s stream of commerce theory can be best
described as dicta. However, the battle lines had been drawn in Asahi, and it was
only a matter of time before the Court revisited the issue.
That happened in 2011 in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.102 In that
case, the New Jersey Supreme Court had upheld the state’s exercise of jurisdiction
over an English machine manufacturer that had sold a machine to a New Jersey
manufacturer at a trade show in Las Vegas.103 The new owner shipped the machine
to its New Jersey factory.104 Nicastro, an employee, suffered a severe injury while
operating the machine and later brought a product liability claim against the
97. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
98. Id. at 111-12.
99. Id. at 112-13.
100. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[M]ost courts and
commentators have found that jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product in the stream of
commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause, and have not required a showing of additional
conduct.”); see also id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In most
circumstances I would be inclined to conclude that a regular course of dealing that results in deliveries
of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years would constitute ‘purposeful availment’
even though the item delivered to the forum State was a standard product marketed throughout the
world.”).
101. Id. at 116.
102. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
103. Id. at 2785.
104. Id. at 2786, 2791.
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English manufacturer in New Jersey state court.105
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court
and held that the English defendant lacked sufficient minimum contacts with New
Jersey.106 Four of the six Justices would have struck down the stream of commerce
theory and concluded that the plaintiff must show that the defendant had targeted
the state or purposefully directed its activities at the state before the defendant
could be said to have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state.107
The concurring Justices, Breyer and Alito, agreed that minimum contacts with
New Jersey were lacking in the case, but felt that the targeting standard proposed
by the four Justice plurality was too demanding.108 They agreed with the majority
that something more than putting goods into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that consumers would buy and use those goods in the forum state had
to be demonstrated.109 Precisely what additional acts beyond putting goods into the
stream of commerce—but short of targeting—would serve to satisfy the minimum
contacts standard remains unclear. For example, would some advertising or
promotional activity by the defendant within the forum state, in addition to the
actual sale of goods, suffice? Clearly, the constitutional standards for measuring
minimum contacts have been recalibrated, and putting goods into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be used in the forum state is no
longer enough to satisfy Due Process.
2.

Area 4 - General Jurisdiction

In marked contrast to Area 3 jurisdiction, Area 4 jurisdiction, often referred to
as general jurisdiction, has gotten relatively little attention—until very recently. In
International Shoe, the Supreme Court declined to address the constitutionality of
Area 4 jurisdiction, but did recognize that some courts had upheld the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction over foreign entities having a substantial presence in the
forum on claims unrelated to any activities within the forum state.110
The Supreme Court first explicitly addressed the issue of Area 4 jurisdiction
directly in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.111 Defendant Benguet
operated mines in the Philippines, which, prior to World War II, was a territory of
the United States.112 Following the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in
December of 1941, Benguet suspended mining operations there; management
relocated to Ohio, where its president conducted the business activities of the
company.113 Plaintiff was a shareholder who sued the company in Ohio state court

105. Id. at 2786.
106. Id. at 2785.
107. Id. at 2790-91.
108. Id. at 2792-93.
109. Id. at 2792-94.
110. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
111. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
112. See Recinto v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 706 F. 3d 1171, 1173 (9th Cir. 2012) (when
World War II began, the Philippines were still a United States territory).
113. Id. at 447-48.
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for failure to pay dividends or issue stock.114 Plaintiff’s claim did not arise out of
any activities by the defendant in the forum state.115
The Supreme Court upheld the exercise of general jurisdiction, concluding that
although mining activities had been suspended during the Japanese occupation,
many of Benguet’s wartime activities “were directed from Ohio and were being
given the personal attention of the president in that State[.]”116 Benguet maintained
an office in Ohio where company files were kept and two secretaries were
employed.117 Directors’ meetings were held in Ohio.118 Company business
decisions were made in Ohio, and the rehabilitation of property in the Philippines,
once the war ended, was directed from Ohio.119 The company maintained
substantial bank accounts in Ohio and retained an Ohio bank to serve as transfer
agent for stock in the company.120 In short, Benguet’s president “carried on in Ohio
a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime
activities of the company.”121 As the Court later explained, general jurisdiction
existed in Perkins because “Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if temporary,
place of business.”122
However, the factual circumstances giving rise to this suit in Ohio—
specifically, the intervention of World War II and the Japanese invasion of the
Philippines that effectively rendered the Philippines civil justice system
inaccessible—left some doubt as to whether Perkins was a carte blanch
endorsement of general jurisdiction or simply sui generis. Over three decades later,
in its Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall123 decision, the Supreme Court
suggested that the Perkins holding is not limited to the peculiar facts in that case.124
In Helicopteros, the plaintiffs were the survivors and representatives of
construction workers employed by a Texas entity who had been killed in a
helicopter crash in Peru while being ferried from a worksite.125 Plaintiffs brought a
wrongful death action in Texas state court, and the Texas courts ultimately upheld
the exercise of jurisdiction over the Colombia-based defendant.126 The Supreme
Court concluded that “the kind of systematic and continuous general business
contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins” did not exist in Helicopteros.127
The Court pointed out two key distinctions between Perkins and Helicopteros.
First, in Perkins, defendant was conducting all of its business activities out of Ohio;
114. Id. at 439.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 448.
117. Id. at 447-48.
118. Id. at 448.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011).
123. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
124. See id. at 414 (“Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign
corporation’s activities in the forum state, due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the
corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the state and the
foreign corporation.”).
125. Id. at 409-10.
126. Id. at 412-13.
127. Id. at 416.
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its contacts with Ohio were systematic and continuous.128 In Helicopteros, on the
other hand, defendant’s contacts with the forum state were isolated and sporadic,
consisting of trips to Texas to negotiate a contract and to buy helicopters, spare
parts and training services.129 Second, whereas defendant in Perkins was a seller of
commodities, defendant in Helicopteros entered Texas to purchase goods and
services.130 The Court concluded that visits to a state to purchase, “even if
occurring at regular intervals,” would not warrant the inference that the corporation
was present within the jurisdiction.131
Although the Court ultimately held that the plaintiff failed to make the case for
general jurisdiction, the upshot of Helicopteros seemed to be that Perkins was not
sui generis.132 The exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations
engaged in substantial and continuous activity would be constitutional even with
respect to claims that are unrelated to defendant’s activities within the forum state.
Still, the Court remained hazy on precisely what constituted substantial and
continuous activity sufficient to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction. On the
one hand, the opinion suggests that plaintiff need not show that the forum was the
defendant’s principal place of business.133 On the other hand, the Court did not
budge from its earlier ruling in International Shoe that “continuous activity of some
sorts within a state is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be
amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.”134
III. GENERAL JURISDICTION REVISITED AND RESTATED
A. Confusion in the Law
Throughout the twentieth century, the law with respect to the exercise of
general jurisdiction over corporations remained confused.135 Part of the confusion
stemmed from the fundamental differences between individuals and corporations.
Historically, the bases for exercising in personam jurisdiction have been the same
with respect to individuals and corporations, with one important exception:
presence, the archetypical grounds for exercising jurisdiction over an individual, is
not a basis on which to proceed against corporations.136 Whereas an individual can
be in only one place at any given time, a corporation—an artificial entity that can
act only through individuals—is theoretically “present” in any and every location
in which the corporation conducts business activities.137 Courts have long
recognized the unfairness inherent in forcing a corporation to defend an action
wherever it conducts operations, particularly where the alleged activities
128. Id. at 415.
129. Id. at 416.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 418.
132. Id. at 414; see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
133. See id. at 414-15.
134. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
135. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 755-58 (2014) (tracing the trajectory of general
jurisdiction).
136. SIEGEL, supra note 4, § 82, at 139-40.
137. Id.
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underlying the plaintiff’s claim are unrelated to corporate activities in the forum
state.138 Courts have long recognized that a corporation could be subject to general
jurisdiction in its state of incorporation, that is, its domicile.139 Accordingly, a New
York corporation could be sued in New York on a claim arising in Texas, but a
Florida corporation could not be sued in New York on the same claim.
As the territorial approach to jurisdiction espoused in Pennoyer began to wane,
states looked for ways to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction. As
discussed below,140 one avenue was consent. States would require foreign
corporations to appoint agents for service of process as a quid pro quo for
authorization to do business within the state and assert jurisdiction on a consent or
implied consent theory.141
Although that approach may be effective against foreign corporations that
actually registered to do business,142 it would not capture those companies that did
not register. To fill this gap, state courts began to assert general jurisdiction over
foreign corporations having continuous and substantial presence within the state on
the theory that such a company is “present” within the state.143 Hence, the socalled corporate presence doctrine emerged. The New York Court of Appeals
decision in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.144 illustrates that corporate presence
doctrine.
Tauza involved a claim by a New York domiciliary against a Pennsylvania
corporation, headquartered in Philadelphia with offices in New York City, on a
claim totally unrelated to defendant’s New York activities.145 Defendant’s New
York office was run by a sales agent who supervised eight salesmen as well as
clerical staff.146 The salesmen met daily to receive instructions from their superiors
and to systematically and regularly solicit orders for coal, which were then
transmitted to corporate headquarters in Pennsylvania for approval and which
resulted in continuous shipments of coal from Pennsylvania to New York.147 On
these facts, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]o do these things is to do business
within this state in such a sense and in such a degree as to subject the corporation
doing them to the jurisdiction of our courts.”148 The general jurisdiction principles
embodied in Tauza were subsequently codified in New York’s procedural code.149
Although the question of sufficiency of in-state activity necessary to establish
138. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319; see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1066 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated December 2015).
139. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 760.
140. See infra notes 200-237 and accompanying text.
141. See D. Craig Lewis, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations Based On Registration and
Appointment of an Agent: An Unconstitutional Condition Perpetuated, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (1990)
(A majority of courts “have applied various forms of consent theory to hold that by [appointment of an
agent] a foreign corporation automatically submits itself to unlimited assertion of a state’s
jurisdiction.”).
142. See SIEGEL, supra, note 4, § 82, at 143.
143. Id. at 140.
144. 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
145. Id. at 265, 268.
146. Id. at 265.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 266.
149. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 301 (MCKINNEY, Westlaw through L.2016 chapter 1).
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that a foreign corporation is in New York “with a fair measure of permanence and
continuity”150 has not been free from doubt, the New York courts have generally
focused on the following factors: (1) the existence of an office in New York; (2) the
solicitation of business in New York; (3) the presence of bank accounts or other
personal property within the state; and (4) the presence of employees or agents in
the state.151
The Supreme Court in International Shoe cited Tauza as an example of an
instance “in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought
so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities” but did not rule at that
point on the constitutionality of general jurisdiction.152 Tauza was subsequently
cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Perkins, wherein it upheld the
constitutionality of general jurisdiction.153
Nevertheless, the parameters of the exercise of jurisdiction under the corporate
presence doctrine remained fuzzy. Judge Learned Hand expressed that uncertainty:
Possibly the maintenance of a regular agency for the solicitation of business will
serve without more . . . . In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., . . . there was no
more, but the business was continuous and substantial. Purchases, though carried
on regularly, are not enough . . . nor are the activities of subsidiary corporations
. . . or of connecting carriers . . . . The maintenance of an office, though always a
make-weight, and enough, when accompanied by continuous negotiation, to settle
claims . . . is not of much significance . . . . It is quite impossible to establish any
rule from the decided cases; we must step from tuft to tuft across the morass.154

More recently, the federal courts have seen an influx of foreign-based claims
against foreign defendants by plaintiffs from outside of the United States, many of
which involve general jurisdiction.155 In addition to the due process concerns that
mirror those in domestic general jurisdiction cases, these cases raise more
fundamental concerns of comity and international cooperation.156
In two recent decisions, the Supreme Court has addressed the issues left open
in Helicopteros and clarified the constitutional standards for the exercise of general
jurisdiction.
1.

Goodyear

In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,157 plaintiffs, whose sons
died in a bus accident outside Paris, France, brought a wrongful death action in
North Carolina state court against an American tire manufacturer and three foreign
subsidiaries, alleging that the accident had been caused by defective tire
150. See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917).
151. See Rates Tech., Inc. v. Cequel Commc’ns, 15 F. Supp. 3d 409, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting
Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1990)).
152. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
153. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1951) (stating that exercise of
jurisdiction in both Perkins and Tauza would not offend Int’l Shoe).
154. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) (citations omitted).
155. See infra notes 258-263 and accompanying text.
156. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct 746, 762-63 (2014).
157. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
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manufacture.158 Plaintiffs sought to assert general jurisdiction in North Carolina
over the three foreign subsidiaries.159 The Court found that the foreign subsidiaries
carried on no business activities in North Carolina.160 Nor were the tires involved
in the accident ever distributed in North Carolina by the foreign subsidiaries,
although a small percentage of tires manufactured by the foreign subsidiaries did
find their way into North Carolina through other Goodyear USA affiliates.161 The
North Carolina courts upheld the exercise of general jurisdiction noting that the
tires manufactured by the foreign subsidiaries reach North Carolina through the
stream of commerce as a consequence of a “highly-organized distribution process”
involving Goodyear USA subsidiaries and defendants made “no attempt to keep
these tires from reaching the North Carolina market.”162
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the “sprawling view” of general
jurisdiction enunciated by the North Carolina court that “any substantial
manufacturer or seller of goods would be amenable to suit, on any claim for relief,
wherever its products are distributed.”163 Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg
reiterated the language of International Shoe that “continuous activity of some
sort[]” within a state is not enough to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction.164
Rather, general jurisdiction may be exercised in “instances in which the continuous
corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to
justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from
those activities.”165 The key to the exercise of general jurisdiction for Justice
Ginsburg was whether the corporation’s activities were such that it was “at home”
in the forum state.166 Justice Ginsburg suggested that a corporation may be fairly
regarded as “at home” in the state of incorporation or principal place of business,167
noting that jurisdiction in Perkins had been upheld because “Ohio was the
corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business.”168 The Court, however,
did not rule that state of incorporation and principal place of business are the
exclusive bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction and left open the question of
whether a corporation may be viewed as “at home” in another state where it had
substantial business activities.169
2.

Daimler

Three years later, in Daimler AG v. Bauman,170 the Court revisited the question
of when a foreign defendant’s forum activities are sufficient to justify the exercise
158. Id. at 2850.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2852.
161. Id.
162. Id. (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 2856.
164. Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
165. Id. at 2853 (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318).
166. Id. at 2853-54.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2856 (citation omitted).
169. Id. at 2853; see also id. at 2854 (referring to place of incorporation and principal place of
business as “‘paradig[m]’ bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction”) (citation omitted).
170. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).

2016]

GENERAL JURISDICTION 2.0

305

of personal jurisdiction with respect to claims unrelated to the defendant’s forum
activities.
The facts in Daimler were unusual. Plaintiffs, twenty-two residents of
Argentina, sued Daimler, a German corporation, in a California federal court, under
the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, alleging that
MB Argentina, Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary, had collaborated with
Argentinian state security forces “to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill plaintiffs and
their relatives during the military dictatorship in place there from 1976 through
1983[.]”171 The alleged illegal acts occurred in Argentina; none of the acts
complained of took place in California or any place else within the United States.172
Nor did the plaintiffs charge that any American company acted unlawfully.173
Plaintiffs claimed that Daimler, the only named defendant, was vicariously liable
for the conduct of its Argentinian subsidiary.174
California jurisdiction over Daimler was predicated on the California acts of
MBUSA, Daimler’s North American subsidiary, a Delaware limited liability
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey.175 MBUSA served
as Daimler’s exclusive distributor in the United States purchasing cars
manufactured in Germany by Daimler, importing them and distributing them to
independent dealerships located throughout the United States.176 MBUSA had
multiple California-based facilities, including an office in Costa Mesa, a vehicle
preparation center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irvine. MBUSA’s California
sales accounted for 2.4% of Daimler’s sales worldwide.177
The trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.178 The Ninth Circuit
initially agreed, but upon rehearing, reversed and upheld jurisdiction over Daimler
on an agency theory.179 In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit relied on prior Circuit
precedent focusing on “whether the subsidiary ‘performs services that are
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a
representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would undertake to
perform substantially similar services.’”180 The Ninth Circuit concluded that they
were.181 The Supreme Court, without passing judgment directly on the viability of
the agency theory, rejected the Ninth Circuit approach because it would “stack the
deck” in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction and would uphold jurisdiction over
foreign corporations whenever they have an in-state subsidiary performing services
for the parent.182 That is so because presumably anything that the corporation does
through a subsidiary is something that it would do itself were the subsidiary

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 750-51.
Id. at 751-52.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 758-59.
Id. at 759.
Id.
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unavailable.183 Such a result would go beyond “even the ‘sprawling view of
general jurisdiction’. . . rejected in Goodyear.”184
The Court then recapitulated its Goodyear holding chapter and verse, stressing
that “the inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum
contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is whether
that corporation’s affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to
render [it] at home in the forum State.”185 The Court reiterated that the “paradig[m]
. . . bases” for exercising general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation are the
state of incorporation and the state of principal place of business, since both these
affiliations are unique, easily ascertainable, and allow for development of simple,
predictable jurisdictional rules.186 The Court also stated explicitly what had been
implicit in Goodyear: although the place of incorporation and principal place of
business are paradigm bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction, they are not the
exclusive bases; a foreign corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction in a
state other than the state of incorporation or the state of its principal place of
business.187
Still, the Court shed little light on the nature and quality of activities within a
state to establish that a foreign corporation is “at home” there. Plaintiffs in
Daimler had argued that the foreign corporation would be subject to general
jurisdiction in every state in which it had a substantial, continuous, and systematic
course of business, a view the Court dismissed, observing that “[i]f Daimler’s
California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in
California, the same global reach would presumably be available in every other
state in which MBUSA’s sales are sizable.”188 The Court reasoned that “[s]uch
exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction” make it difficult for foreign
corporations to structure their conduct of business in a manner that would enable
them to predict with some certainty where they will or will not be amenable to suit
as required by due process.189
Moreover, the Court reasoned that the international context in which the claims
arose militated against the exercise of general jurisdiction.190 The Court was
troubled by the fact that claims asserted under United States law by twenty-two
183. Id. at 759-60.
184. Id. at 760 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856
(2011)).
185. Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 760 (alterations in original).
187. The Court stated:
We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, . . . a corporation’s
operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of
business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home
in that State. But this case presents no occasion to explore that question, because
Daimler’s activities in California plainly do not approach that level. It is one thing to
hold a corporation answerable for operations in the forum State, . . . quite another to
expose it to suit on claims having no connection whatever to the forum State.
Id. at 760-61 n.19.
188. Id. at 761.
189. Id. at 761-62.
190. Id. at 763 (“Other nations do not share the uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction
advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case.”).
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Argentinian residents against a German corporation for conduct occurring in
Argentina had been entertained by a California federal court in the first place.191 In
the Court’s view, to allow these cases to proceed would pose a serious risk to
international comity.192 The expansive view of general jurisdiction adopted by the
Ninth Circuit is at odds with the more limited view of jurisdiction based on
domicile that many trading partners of the United States hold.193 The Court noted
that in the past, the broad view of personal jurisdiction asserted by some United
States courts has hampered international negotiations on reciprocal recognition and
enforcement of judgments.194 The Court further noted that attempts to sue foreign
entities based on the acts of their domestic subsidiaries under principles of general
jurisdiction could discourage foreign investment and generate international
friction.195 Accordingly, exercise of jurisdiction on the facts before the court would
offend traditional notions of “fair play and substantial justice.”196
IV. IMPACT OF DAIMLER
A. Death of the Corporate Presence Doctrine
Daimler strikes the death knell to the corporate presence doctrine. The
Daimler court marginalized Tauza, noting that it was “decided in an era dominated
by Pennoyer’s territorial thinking” and “should not attract heavy reliance today.”197
In short, Tauza, to the extent that it ever reflected a majority view, is no longer
good law.198 After Daimler, the doctrine of general jurisdiction has little
independent significance. Corporations could always be sued on any claim in their
state of incorporation or the functional equivalent, the principal place of business.
There will be the occasional Perkins-like case that the courts may deem
exceptional; however, by and large, general jurisdiction after Daimler has gone the
way of quasi in rem jurisdiction after Shaffer. That is, it exists more in theory than
in reality, and that is not necessarily bad. There may be cases where Daimler
inconveniences plaintiffs, but Daimler does not prevent plaintiffs from invoking
personal jurisdiction based on acts within the forum state or consent.
Daimler, of course, applies only to corporations. Nevertheless, it raises an
interesting question. If general jurisdiction over a corporation can be exercised
only where the corporation is “at home,” should not the same be true regarding
individuals? The next logical step is for the Court to revisit its ruling in Burnham
that fortuitous presence within a state is a sufficient basis upon which to exercise in
personam jurisdiction.
191. See id. at 762-63.
192. Id. at 763.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citations omitted).
197. Id. at 761 n.18.
198. Vincent C. Alexander, Supp. Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of NY, 2015
Electronic Update, CPLR C301:8 (“[Daimler] has brought an end to doing business jurisdiction of the
type manifested in [Tauza].”); see generally Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future
of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671 (2012).
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B. General Jurisdiction Based On Corporate Registration Statutes
Goodyear and Daimler call into question the extent to which state courts can
exercise general jurisdiction over foreign corporations based on state registration
statutes. For a variety of reasons, states require foreign corporations to register
with state authorities to conduct business activities within that state.199 All states
require that, as part of the registration process, the foreign corporation designate an
agent, who may be a state official, for service of process within the state.200 Failure
to register typically means that the state’s courthouse doors will be closed to the
delinquent company;201 therefore, corporations have a strong incentive to comply
with the registration process in order to assure that they can enforce contracts and
other obligations entered into in a given state.202 The courts have historically
disagreed about whether the foreign corporation would subject itself to general
jurisdiction by the act of registration.203
1.

Implied Consent

The early cases upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign corporation
that had registered to do business in a state on the theory that by appointing an
agent for service of process, it impliedly consented to the exercise of general
jurisdiction and thus could be sued in a state where it had registered on claims
unrelated to its in-state activities. In the leading case of Pennsylvania Fire
Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.,204 the Supreme Court, per
Justice Holmes, upheld jurisdiction in an action where an Arizona plaintiff sued a
Pennsylvania corporation in Missouri state court based on an insurance claim
arising in Colorado.205 In that 1917 opinion, Justice Holmes reasoned that by
registering to do business in Missouri, the defendant foreign corporation had
consented to service of process in Missouri.206 The Court rejected defendant’s
argument that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Missouri court on a matter that did
not involve a Missouri contract was a denial of due process.207 It ruled that the
defendant, by complying with the statute and designating an agent for service of
process, ran the “risk of the interpretation that might be put upon [the statute] by
the [Missouri] courts,”208 thus “hardly leav[ing] a constitutional question open.”209
The decision made no mention of the defendant’s in-state activities.
199. See SIEGEL, supra note 4 at § 30, p. 36.
200. See generally Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of Permitting
Registration Statutes to Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1 (1990).
201. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1312 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2016, chapter 1).
202. Id.
203. Compare Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95
(1917) (holding that registration confers consent), with King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570,
579 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the appointment of an agent is helpful in determining amenability to
suit, but general jurisdiction principles must govern).
204. 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
205. Id. at 94.
206. Id. at 96.
207. Id. at 94-95.
208. Id. at 96.
209. Id. at 95.
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Pennsylvania Fire Insurance has not been directly overruled by the Supreme
Court, but its rationale has been severely undermined by subsequent Supreme
Court decisions.210 The Pennsylvania Fire Insurance decision was cut from the
Pennoyer mold, which limited the exercise of personal jurisdiction to situations
where the defendant was present within the state when served or consented to
jurisdiction. That approach is clearly out of step with the Court’s later
jurisdictional pronouncements in International Shoe and its progeny, which shift
the focus of jurisdictional analysis away from concepts of physical power and
territoriality and toward a more flexible standard focusing on the “quality and
nature” of the defendant’s forum activities, the relationship between those forum
activities and the plaintiff’s claim for relief, and fundamental principles of
fairness.211
Not surprisingly, the lower courts have not been in agreement on the
continuing vitality of Pennsylvania Fire Insurance post-International Shoe. Some
courts212 continue to view that case as authoritative and uphold that compliance
with the registration process constitutes implied consent to general jurisdiction.
Other courts,213 focusing on post-International Shoe developments have held that
compliance with the registration process does not by itself establish consent to the
exercise of general jurisdiction.214 Under this view, service of process on the
designated agent may establish the requisite notice of suit but does not provide a
basis for jurisdiction.215
The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the continuing vitality of
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance in the wake of International Shoe. However, in
210. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (noting that the quality and
nature of defendant’s forum activities as well as fundamental fairness determine whether the exercise of
jurisdiction comports with due process).
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (“We need not decide whether
authorization to do business in Pennsylvania is a ‘continuous and systematic’ contact with the
Commonwealth . . . because such registration by a foreign corporation carries with it consent to be sued
in Pennsylvania.”); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc. 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990) (“We
conclude that appointment of an agent for service of process under [the Minnesota statute] gives consent
to the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts for any cause of action, whether or not arising out of activities
within the state. Such consent is a valid basis of personal jurisdiction, and resort to minimum–contacts
or due-process analysis to justify the jurisdiction is unnecessary.”).
213. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Cooper Labs, Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971) (“The principles of due
process require a firmer foundation than mere compliance with state domestication statutes.”); Wenche
Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Not only does the mere act of
registering an agent not create Learjet’s general business presence in Texas, it also does not act as
consent to be hauled into Texas courts on any dispute with any party anywhere concerning any matter.”).
214. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 14-4083, 2016 WL 641392, at *17 (2d Cir. Feb. 18,
2016). The Court stated:
So, here we believe that the holding in Pennsylvania Fire cannot be divorced from the
outdated jurisprudential assumptions of its era. The sweeping interpretation that a state
court gave to a routine registration statute and an accompanying power of attorney that
Pennsylvania Fire credited as a general “consent” has yielded to the doctrinal refinement
reflected in Goodyear and Daimler and the Court’s 21st century approach to general and
specific jurisdiction in light of expectations created by the continuing expansion of
interstate and global business.
215. See King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570, 579 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Shaffer v. Heitner,216 the Court did rule in the context of a due process challenge to
the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction, that “all assertions of state court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny.”217 The Court in Shaffer also stressed that the focus of
jurisdictional analysis subsequent to International Shoe had shifted away from the
narrow formalistic concepts of in-state service and consent advocated by Pennoyer
to an examination of “the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the
litigation.”218 A foreign corporation may well be registered in a state but have no
meaningful business activities within that state. The foreign corporation’s only
nexus with the forum would be its registration, and there would be no connection
among the defendant and forum, on the one hand, and the litigation on the other
hand. The exercise of jurisdiction in that circumstance would seemingly run
contrary to the standards enunciated in International Shoe and reiterated in Shaffer
that only after evaluating the defendant-foreign corporation’s contacts with the
forum can jurisdiction be determined.219
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Goodyear and Daimler reinforce this
view. Again, neither case specifically addresses the issue of whether appointment
of an agent for service of process, as part of the registration process implies consent
to the exercise of general jurisdiction. In fact, both cases involved defendants that
had been incorporated outside of the United States, who had neither registered with
any state authority nor sought authorization to do business in any state.
Nevertheless, the reasoning of these cases, particularly the Court’s mandate
that any jurisdictional analysis must be based on the nature and quality of a
company’s contacts with the forum, strongly suggests that general jurisdiction
would not be upheld on the basis of implied consent through mere compliance with
state corporate registration statutes. The lower courts, however, have not been
uniform in their assessment of the impact of Daimler and Goodyear on assertions
of general jurisdiction over foreign companies based on compliance with state
registration statutes.
An interesting split of authority has emerged in the District of Delaware with
respect to the exercise of general jurisdiction over the very same company, Mylan
Pharmaceuticals.220 In AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court
held that under Daimler, a foreign corporation’s mere compliance with corporate
registration statutes does not give rise to general jurisdiction over that foreign
corporation.221 First, the court concluded “[b]oth consent and minimum contacts
. . . are rooted in due process [and that] [j]ust as minimum contacts must be present
so as not to offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’ the

216. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
217. Id. at 212.
218. Id. at 204.
219. King, 632 F.3d at 578-80.
220. Compare AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554-57 (D. Del. 2015)
(finding no general jurisdiction under Daimler) with Acorda Therapeutics Inc., v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.,78
F. Supp. 2d 572, 588-92 (D. Del. 2015) (distinguishing Daimler and upholding jurisdiction based on
consent).
221. AstraZeneca AB, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556-57.

2016]

GENERAL JURISDICTION 2.0

311

defendants alleged ‘consent’ to jurisdiction must do the same.”222 In finding that a
simple showing of “continuous and systematic contacts” could not establish general
jurisdiction, Daimler “rejected the idea that a company could be haled into court
merely for ‘doing business’ in a state.”223 Under that theory, out of state
corporations could not “structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will or will not render them liable to suit.”224
Second, were compliance a basis of jurisdiction, companies with a nationwide
presence would be subject to suit all over the country, an outcome that Daimler
specifically sought to avoid.225 Third, the Court reasoned that a contrary holding
would create “perverse incentives”: companies that complied could be sued in that
state, but companies that disobeyed the law would be immune from suit.226 Fourth,
the court found that Delaware’s registration statutes merely outline procedures for
doing business in Delaware and do not address jurisdictional issues.227 On the
other hand, the court in Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.228 upheld jurisdiction based compliance with the Delaware registration
statutes.229 The Acorda court reasoned that the Daimler holding was directed at the
issue of the foreign defendant’s minimum contacts, not at the issue of consent.230
The Acorda court further reasoned that Daimler, by its reference to Perkins,
recognized consent as an independent basis for in personam jurisdiction.231
In so ruling, the Acorda court took issue with the earlier decision in
AstraZeneca.232 The Acorda court distinguished between “doing business” in a
state and compliance with registration statutes.233 It urged that a company that is
registered in a state, as opposed to merely doing business, has notice of potential
amenability to suits and can structure its conduct so as to avoid law suits in a given
state.234 The Acorda court did acknowledge the conceptual strain in accepting the
Daimler holding that a foreign corporation cannot be subject to general jurisdiction
for merely “doing business” in that state, on the one hand, but that the very same
corporation can be subject to general jurisdiction in any state where the corporation
complies with the registration statutes, irrespective of its contacts, on the other
hand.235
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Delaware District Court had
specific jurisdiction over the defendant and sidestepped the general jurisdiction
issue.236
222. Id. at 556.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 761-62 (2014).
226. Astra Zeneca AB, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 557.
227. Id.
228. 78 F.Supp. 2d 572 (D.Del. 2015).
229. Id. at 584-85.
230. Id. at 581-82, 588-89.
231. Id. at 589.
232. Id. at 590-91.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 591.
235. Id.
236. Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Nos. 2015-1456, 2015-1460, 2016
WL 1077048, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 18, 2016).
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Express Consent

Several states, as part of the registration process, require express consent to
jurisdiction, irrespective of where the claim arises.237 The question of whether this
express consent cures the jurisdictional defects that arise with respect to implied
consent has not been addressed by the courts. A pro-jurisdiction argument might be
crafted by analogy to the Supreme Court’s decision in Burnham v. Superior
Court.238 The issue in Burnham was whether the fortuitous presence of a defendant
within a given state was sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction over that
defendant.239 In Burnham, the defendant was a New Jersey domiciliary whose
former wife and child lived in California.240 The defendant travelled to California
to visit his child and also to conduct other business.241 While in California, he was
served with process in an action commenced by his former wife in California state
court.242 The defendant argued that under Shaffer, jurisdiction was void.243 Shaffer
had held that the fortuitous presence of property within a state was by itself an
insufficient basis for that state to proceed quasi in rem against the defendant.244
Given the Shaffer holding, defendant argued, fortuitous presence of an individual
within a state could not confer in personam jurisdiction.245
The Supreme Court in Burnham disagreed with the defendant and held that
California’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him based on personal service of
process while present with the state did not violate due process.246 The Court,
however, could not piece together a majority opinion supporting its ruling. Writing
for the plurality, Justice Scalia reasoned that presence is a jurisdictional principle
that “is both firmly approved by tradition and still favored” and that “its validation
is its pedigree, as the phrase ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’
makes clear.”247 Justice Scalia also distinguished International Shoe, noting that
that case involved an action against a foreign corporation, served outside of the
state, and not service of process on an individual present within the state.248
Writing separately, Justice Brennan maintained that jurisdiction based on fortuitous
presence in California be upheld because defendant had minimum contacts with the
state by virtue of the fact that his physical presence within the state entitled him to
all protections of California law.249
From Burnham, one can argue that consent, like presence, is a traditionally
recognized basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction and shares the same
pedigree. However, the analogy of consent to presence is flawed. First, it is a

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 304 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2016, chapter 1).
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
Id. at 608.
Id. at 607-08.
Id. at 608.
Id.
Id. at 619-20.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209, 212 (1977).
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 620.
Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 621-22.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 637-39 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Pennoyer-esque argument that honors form over substance, and is at odds with the
mandate of International Shoe to analyze the exercise of jurisdiction in accordance
with the nature and quality of the defendant’s contacts with the forum.250 Second,
statutorily coerced consent requiring foreign corporations to defend any and all
claims in that state, irrespective of where the claims arise, is unreasonable and
contrary to the rule of International Shoe that assertion of jurisdiction over foreign
entities must comport with fair play and substantial justice.251 Accordingly, it
violates due process to force a foreign corporation, not “at home” in the forum, to
defend a claim arising elsewhere. This is not to suggest that all statutes that coerce
personal jurisdiction are unconstitutional. Law, by its very nature, is coercive.
Only when a state statute is unreasonably coercive would enforced consent offend a
foreign corporation’s due process rights.
Third, coerced general jurisdiction is unnecessary. Even under Goodyear and
Daimler, domestic corporations would still be subject to jurisdiction somewhere in
the United States—either in the state of incorporation or the state of its principal
place of business, irrespective of any consent. In both Goodyear and Daimler,
defendants were incorporated abroad, operating abroad and not seeking to do
business in the United States. Given this fact, it is difficult to see how a forum’s
subjecting defendants in either case to personal jurisdiction with respect to claims
arising overseas serves any legitimate interest of that forum, beyond perhaps seeing
justice done. Nor does exercise of such jurisdiction serve the interests of the
interstate civil justice system. It is one thing to subject a foreign corporation to
jurisdiction based on claims arising in the forum state, it is quite another to force
that corporation to defend claims unrelated to any forum activities simply to see
that justice is done. Goodyear and Daimler do make it more difficult to sue
corporations formed and operating outside of the United States in American courts
on a general jurisdiction theory. That is not necessarily bad.
C. Concerns for International Comity
The fact that the defendant was an overseas corporation doing business on an
international scale played no small part in Daimler’s decision denying general
jurisdiction. The Court pointedly criticized the Ninth Circuit because “[it] paid
little heed to the risks to international comity its expansive view of general
jurisdiction posed.”252 The Court noted that “[o]ther nations do not share the
uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of Appeals in
this case,” pointing out that in Europe, jurisdiction over corporations is largely
limited to the country of a corporation’s domicile.253
The Court also cited instances where the expansive view of general jurisdiction
expressed by United States domestic courts had in the past “impeded negotiations
of international agreements on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of
judgments” and led to international friction.254 The Court, in addition, noted
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 342 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
Id. at 316.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014).
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
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concerns that exercising general jurisdiction over foreign companies based on the
activities of American-based subsidiaries could discourage foreign investors.255
Accordingly, it concluded that “subjecting Daimler to general jurisdiction of courts
in California would not accord with the ‘fair play and substantial justice’ due
process demands.”256
The Daimler decision is consistent with other recent Supreme Court rulings
shutting the doors of American courts to foreign plaintiffs suing on claims arising
abroad against foreign defendants. For example, in F. Hoffman LaRoche Ltd. v.
Empagran, S.A.,257 the Court held that principles of prescriptive comity militated
against an expansive reading of the American antitrust laws that would allow
United States courts to hear private treble damage actions brought by foreign
plaintiffs against foreign defendants on claims arising outside of the United
States.258 Similarly, in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,259 the Court ruled
that the American securities laws do not provide a claim for relief by foreign
plaintiffs against foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection
with securities traded on foreign exchanges.260 Most recently, in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum,261 an action under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) brought in the
Southern District of New York by Nigerian Nationals against British, Dutch and
Nigerian corporations alleging that defendants aided and abetted torture by the
Nigerian government, the Court ruled that that ATS did not apply to violations of
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States.262
The plaintiffs’ principal motivation in choosing United States venues in these
cases was apparently to get the benefit of more favorable American law. The
upshot of the decisions in Empagran, Morrison, and Kiobel was to (1) prevent
blatant forum shopping in the United States by foreign plaintiffs; (2) demonstrate
mutual respect for the legal systems of other sovereign nations; and (3) minimize
the influx of foreign cases into the United States, thereby preventing the American
court system from becoming a magnet for international disputes that should be
litigated elsewhere.
V. QUESTIONS AFTER DAIMLER
A. Attributing Contacts of Subsidiaries to the Parent Corporation
The Court in Daimler did not systematically address the question of whether,
or the extent to which, general jurisdiction may be exercised over a parent
corporation on the basis of the forum contacts of a subsidiary. It is black letter law
that the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not enough to create
personal jurisdiction over the parent on the basis of the subsidiary’s contacts with
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
542 U.S. 155 (2004).
Id. at 164-66.
561 U.S. 247 (2010).
Id. at 265.
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
Id. at 1663.
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the forum.263 Accordingly, the courts will generally respect the separate identities
of a parent and its subsidiaries; and a parent “may be directly involved in the
activities of its subsidiaries without incurring liability so long as that involvement
is consistent with the parent’s investor status.”264 A parent may (1) monitor the
subsidiary’s performance; (2) supervise the subsidiary’s finances; and (3) articulate
policies and procedures for the subsidiary.265
On the other hand, courts may disregard the separateness between parent and
subsidiary, and impute the forum contacts of the subsidiary to the parent for
jurisdictional purposes—where the subsidiary is an agent of the parent266 or where
the subsidiary is the mere alter ego of the parent.267
1.

Alter Ego

A subsidiary is the alter ego of its parent where the parent controls the
subsidiary “to such a degree as to render the latter the mere instrumentality of the
former.”268 A parent treats its subsidiary as a mere instrumentality where the parent
disregards corporate formalities and exercises control over day-to-day operations of
the subsidiary.269 The amount of control exercised must exceed the usual
supervision that a parent exercises over a subsidiary.270 In assessing whether the
degree of control exercised by the parent is sufficient to render the subsidiary an
alter ego, the courts take into account a variety of factors.271
The Court in Daimler did not reach the question of whether MBUSA was the
alter ego of Daimler because the Ninth Circuit in upholding general jurisdiction
263. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001); Transure, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan,
Inc. 766 F.2d 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1985); see generally United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69
(1998), where the Supreme Court, in analyzing corporate separateness for liability purposes, explained:
[I]t is entirely appropriate for directors of a parent corporation to serve as directors of its
subsidiary, and that fact alone may not serve to expose the parent corporation to liability
for its subsidiary’s acts. This recognition that the corporate personalities remain distinct
has its corollary in the “well established principle [of corporate law] that directors and
officers holding positions with a parent and its subsidiary can and do ‘change hats’ to
represent the two corporations separately, despite their common ownership.”
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
264. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 926 (citing Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 69).
265. Id.
266. El-Fadi v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 669, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
267. AT&T Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1996).
268. Calvert v. Huckins, 875 F. Supp. 674, 678 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Inst. of Veterinary
Pathology, Inc. v. California Health Labs., Inc., 172 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1981)).
269. See Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 660, 669 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
270. See In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 641 F. Supp. 2d 367, 386-87 (M.D. Pa.
2009).
271. Id. at 384-85. These factors include (1) whether the parent owns all or most of the subsidiary’s
stock; (2) whether the two companies share the same officers and directors; (3) whether both companies
have a unified marketing image and common branding; (4) whether corporate trademarks are the same
for both companies; (5) whether the two firms have common employees; (6) whether the two firms have
an integrated distribution system; (7) whether the two companies share supervisory personnel; (8)
whether the subsidiary performs business functions that would normally be performed by the parent; (9)
whether the parent uses the subsidiary as its exclusive distributor; and (10) whether the parent directs the
activities of the subsidiaries officers and directors. Id. See also 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1069.4 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated December 2015).
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over Daimler did not rely on this theory.272 Nevertheless, the Court will
undoubtedly be faced with the alter ego issue in the near future. How the Court
would resolve the alter ego issue in light of its Daimler holding is an interesting
question. Assume that a foreign parent treats its wholly owned American
subsidiary as a mere instrumentality so that the alter ego doctrine is clearly in play.
Assume further that the American subsidiary is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Delaware and thus at home in that state. The Court
would likely find that foreign parent subject to general jurisdiction in Delaware
under the alter ego theory.273
Alternatively, suppose the foreign parent has multiple subsidiaries in the
United States, incorporated in different states and having principal places of
business in a variety of states, each of which is treated as a mere instrumentality by
the parent. On those facts, would the Court find the kind of “exorbitant exercises
of all-purpose jurisdiction”274 that it condemned in Daimler? Or, would the Court
put the onus on the parent to restructure its American operations so as to make
amenability to suit more certain and predictable?
2.

Agency

Nor did the Daimler Court directly address the agency issues. The Ninth
Circuit had upheld jurisdiction over Daimler based on the California activities of
MBUSA, ruling that MBUSA “performs services that are sufficiently important to
[Daimler] that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s
own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services.”275 The
Supreme Court, however, declined to “pass judgment on the invocation of an
agency theory in the context of general jurisdiction, for in no event [could] the
appeals court’s analysis be sustained.”276 The Court found that “the inquiry into
importance stacks the deck for it will always yield a pro-jurisdiction answer.”277 Of
course, when something is important to a company, it will undertake the task itself
if it cannot get someone else to perform that task. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s
agency theory would create general jurisdiction over a principal whenever the
principal has an in-state subsidiary or agent, “an outcome that would sweep beyond
even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ we rejected in Goodyear.”278
Thus, even if MBUSA is at home in California and its California contacts are
imputable to Daimler, general jurisdiction over Daimler is lacking because
Daimler’s “slim contacts with the State hardly render it at home there.”279
Although the Court chose not to confront the agency issue directly, the opinion
272. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 758-59 (2014).
273. See, e.g., George v. Uponor Corp., 988 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1078-80 (D. Minn. 2013) (holding
that alter ego jurisdiction over parent company may be exercised under Daimler as long as the forum
state is the subsidiary’s principal place of business because parent is not subject to jurisdiction in all
states where subsidiary conducts business); see generally Alexander, supra note 198, at C301:8.
274. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761.
275. Id. at 758-59.
276. Id. at 759.
277. Id. at 759.
278. Id. at 759-60 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856).
279. Id. at 760.
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leaves little room for the successful invocation of that theory where general
jurisdiction is involved.
B. The Role of Fair Play in the General Jurisdiction Analysis
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether the
fairness prong of the International Shoe analysis applies with the same force in
general jurisdiction cases as in specific jurisdiction cases.280 Still, there is little
reason to doubt that fairness is a critical element of both specific and general
jurisdiction. The lower courts have uniformly so held.281 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has heard only a handful of general jurisdiction cases.
In her Daimler concurrence, Justice Sotomayor called the majority to task for
failure to focus on the fairness issue and failure to dispose of the matter on fairness
grounds, as the Court had done is Asahi in the context of specific jurisdiction.282
Justice Sotomayor seemed particularly troubled by the fact that the majority
decision turned on the sufficiency of Daimler’s California contacts, an issue that
she maintained had not been briefed or argued to the Court.283 She also criticized
the majority for adopting the “at home” standard, which she viewed as (1) at odds
with the “‘continuous and systematic’ contacts inquiry that has been taught to
generations of first-year students” and (2) “a new rule of constitutional law that is
unmoored from decades of precedent.”284
Justice Sotomayor’s criticism of the majority may have been overly harsh.
First, the issue on which the Court granted certiorari fairly encompasses the
question of whether Daimler was “at home” in California.285 Moreover, the
question of sufficiency of Daimler’s contacts was briefed both in the Circuit Court
and the Supreme Court.286 Second, Asahi does not hold that a court must address
the fairness issue at the outset. Asahi turned on fairness because all the Justices
agreed that the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by a California court in a thirdparty action involving a Taiwanese company suing a Japanese entity on
transactions occurring outside of the United States would be unreasonable.287 The
Court in Asahi could not forge a majority on the issue of whether the defendant had
the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state.288 By contrast, in Daimler,

280. Id. at 764-65 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
281. Justice Sotomayor observed:
The Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that the reasonableness prong does in fact
apply in the general jurisdiction context. Without the benefit of a single page of briefing
on the issue, the majority casually adds each of these cases to the mounting list of
decisions jettisoned as a consequence of today’s ruling.
Id. at 764 n.1 (citations omitted).
282. Id. at 762 n.20; see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal, Sonoma Cty., 480 U.S.
102, 113-14 (1987).
283. See Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 766 (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
284. Id. at 770, 773. (citations omitted).
285. Id. at 762 n.20.
286. Id. at 762.
287. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114, 121 (Stevens, J., concurring).
288. Id. at 105, 108-13 (only four Justices joined in that part of the opinion that found minimum
contacts lacking).
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the majority did agree that the requisite minimum contacts were absent.289
Accordingly, there was no need to address the fairness prong of the International
Shoe test in Daimler.
Third, courts have traditionally analyzed contacts before reaching the fairness
issue simply because it is more efficient to do so. In Burger King v. Rudzewicz,290
the Court held that where the minimum contacts prong of the International Shoe
test has been met, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is presumptively fair.291
Justice Ginsburg echoed this view in Daimler, observing that “[w]hen a corporation
is genuinely at home in the forum [s]tate[,] . . . any second-step inquiry would be
superfluous.”292
Fourth, as discussed above, the majority in Daimler did acknowledge fairness
considerations in denying general jurisdiction.293 Although the majority’s
conclusions on fairness supported its holdings, fairness concerns were not central to
the outcome.
C. Meaning of “At Home”
The Daimler Court made clear that a corporation is presumptively at home,
and hence subject to general jurisdiction, in its state of incorporation and where it
has its principal place of business.294 At the same time, the Court acknowledged
that there may be additional factual scenarios where a defendant is “at home” in a
state, citing Perkins as an example.295 Daimler thus offers the lower courts little
guidance on when a corporation is at home beyond the two paradigm cases set forth
in the opinion. The issue of what additional facts might satisfy the at home
criterion is thus likely to come back to the Court in the not too distant future.
D. Too Big for General Jurisdiction?
As Justice Sotomayor points out, the Daimler holding creates the anomalous
situation whereby a large multinational firm with significant business activities
outside of the forum state may escape the exercise of general jurisdiction, while a
smaller company, whose principal place of business is within the forum, but whose
business activities within the forum are far less than those of the multinational firm,
may be subject to general jurisdiction.296 The majority did not dwell on this
anomaly but rather stressed the need for simple, predictable jurisdictional rules that
would permit out of state defendants “to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit.”297 The upshot is that large multinational firms will be amenable to general
289. See Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 759.
290. 471 U.S. 462 (1988).
291. Id. at 476-78.
292. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at, 762 n.20.
293. Id. at 763 (“Considerations of international rapport thus reinforce our determination that
subjecting Daimler to the general jurisdiction of the courts in California would not accord with the ‘fair
play and substantial justice’ due process demands.”) (citations omitted).
294. See id. at 760-61.
295. Id. at 761 n.19.
296. Id. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 762.
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jurisdiction in a very limited number of forums and will thus be “too big” for
general jurisdiction.
E. Individual Proprietors
Also unclear is the impact of Daimler’s at home standard on the exercise of
general jurisdiction over individual proprietors who are neither domiciled in the
forum state nor present there when served with process. Given that an individual
could conduct systematic and continuous business operations in multiple states at
the same time, that individual may well be faced with the kind of “unacceptably
grasping” jurisdictional reach that Daimler eschewed.298 At the same time, an
individual doing business in only one location would be “at home” and hence
subject to general jurisdiction in the state where the business is located.299
VI. CONCLUSION
Daimler redefines general jurisdiction and significantly limits its exercise
involving claims arising outside of the United States against foreign corporations.
Daimler also sounds the death knell for the corporate presence doctrine, whether
defendants are domestic or foreign. At the same time, Daimler makes clear that
domestic corporations are always subject to general jurisdiction in their state(s) of
incorporation and where they have their principal place of business, thus clarifying
and simplifying a jurisdictional doctrine that for many generations lurked in the
shadows. The Court adopted the “at home” standard to create a measure of clarity
and predictability for corporations engaged in interstate or international commerce.
However, it may in the end have created more confusion than certainty and simply
invited more litigation to clarify limits of general jurisdiction. Under the old
“doing business” test not every corporation “doing business” within a state is “at
home” there. Daimler, however, offers little guidance on where to draw the line.

298. Id. at 761.
299. Alexander, supra note 198, at C301:9.

